On 27 January 2026, after referral back from the Supreme Court, the Amsterdam Court of Appeal overturned the earlier ruling of the District Court in the case concerning the employment status of Uber drivers. Whereas the District Court ruled that Uber drivers should be classified as employees, the Court of Appeal reached a fundamentally different conclusion: based on the available information, it cannot be established that drivers who drive for Uber do so on the basis of an employment contract. In this regard, the Court of Appeal emphasises the strong extent of entrepreneurship.
In this ruling, the Court confirms that the question whether someone is an employee or a self-employed professional does not revolve around a single decisive criterion, but rather a comprehensive assessment of the circumstances. Crucially, 'entrepreneurship' is not merely a side criterion, but in specific cases can carry such weight that it tips the balance, even if there are also elements that point more towards employment. The Court thus explicitly shows that it is possible for two workers doing equal work to be classified differently in legal terms if their economic position and entrepreneurship differ significantly.
In addition, the Court makes it clear why it is not possible in these proceedings to give a general opinion on 'all Uber drivers'. The trade union demanded a declaration that all drivers qualify as employees and that the Taxi Collective Labor Agreement therefore applies to them. The Court states that some drivers may be employees, depending on their personal situation. However, because the group of drivers is very diverse and there is too little concrete data on individual circumstances or clearly defined subgroups, the Court cannot determine exactly which drivers this concerns. As long as this remains unclear, no general decision can be made about wages, allowances or other compensation. The claims therefore fail not only on the basis of their content, but also and above all on the lack of substantiated general characteristics per group.
What the Court does specify is how heavily 'entrepreneurship' weighs in this case for the drivers who joined the appeal. This does not concern a label of entrepreneur on paper, but tangible entrepreneurial behavior: substantial investments (particularly in the car), freedom in working hours, strategic choices in whether or not to accept journeys and focusing on profitable hours, working via multiple platforms and bearing risks such as liability and incapacity for work. The Court also attaches importance to the fact that these drivers operate in a (traditionally) 'self-employed market'. According to the Court, it is precisely this combination that makes their position more similar to being self-employed than to being an employee of Uber.
The most important conclusion of this ruling is that the assessment of the qualification question for organizations that work with self-employed professionals increasingly revolves around the total picture: not only contract texts or single factors are decisive, but also the actual organization of the work and the extent to which someone actually behaves as an entrepreneur and is able to bear that responsibility. This criterion of 'entrepreneurship' carries more weight than might initially have been expected. At the same time, the warning remains that individual cases may turn out differently, because not all self-employed professionals are always classified in the same way. Those who work with self-employed professionals who are under the actual management of the client, who run little risk of their own or who have hardly any entrepreneurial freedom, cannot automatically rely on this ruling; the court deliberately leaves that door open.





