Tenant's Real Estate Ownership Justifies Termination of Public Housing Lease

Key message of this ruling¹

In this ruling, the housing association Ymere succeeded in terminating a decades-long social rental agreement with a tenant—who also owns multiple residential properties and commercial spaces—on the grounds of urgent personal use. Urgent personal use is understood to include the ability to re-rent the property to a person seeking housing who does belong to the target group. The tenant occupied a social housing unit and also owned seven residential properties and five commercial spaces. A tenant who owns one or more homes can be expected to have no difficulty finding alternative and suitable housing.

What happened?

The two tenants have been living in a Ymere social housing unit since 1992. Ymere is terminating the lease on the grounds of urgent personal use, because the tenants no longer belong to its target group and the waiting period for social housing now exceeds thirteen years. Ymere’s objective is to rent housing to individuals who have difficulty meeting their own housing needs. Since the tenant owns multiple residential properties and commercial spaces, they no longer fall within this target group. The tenants object, arguing, among other things, that the property is not a social housing unit, that there are compelling interests on the tenants’ side, and that the tenant requires an adapted home due to MS and diabetes. Finally, they argue that terminating the lease after 33 years would be unreasonable and unfair. Nevertheless, the subdistrict court granted Ymere’s claim, setting the termination date for January 1, 2027. Ymere had previously given notice of termination effective November 8, 2025.

Why was the landlord ruled right? 

This ruling centers on the question of what constitutes “own use” and who bears the burden of proof. First, “own use” encompasses not only use by the landlord itself but also leasing that aligns with the organization’s statutory tradition or objective—that is, subleasing to a housing seeker from the target group. Ymere is such an organization. The law identifies a number of specific target groups for whom the exception applies.

Second, when determining whether the tenant can obtain suitable housing elsewhere, there is a heightened duty to provide justification. The burden of proof remains with Ymere, but once Ymere has sufficiently demonstrated that the tenant faces no difficulties in finding suitable alternative housing, the tenant must refute this with concrete, verifiable evidence. The tenants submitted various statements, but these were deemed insufficient. It is of great importance here that the tenants have multiple housing options. Furthermore, a number of these homes are located on the ground floor; the fact that renovations are needed to make the home suitable for the tenant with MS is less relevant in this context.

Third, the subdistrict court judge openly acknowledges that the legal priority given to those who face difficulties in finding housing may mean that a current tenant must give way to a prospective tenant who does meet the requirements of the Housing Act. Nor does the long duration of the tenancy render the termination unacceptable. The judge ruled in favor of Ymere.

Some comments on the ruling

Recently, other subdistrict courts have also ruled in cases with similar facts and circumstances that owning one’s own home can constitute grounds for terminating a lease agreement on the basis of urgent personal use². For the time being, this subdistrict court ruling has not been declared provisionally enforceable, meaning the tenants may continue to occupy the property until a final decision is rendered in the case. In light of this, it stands to reason that the tenants will file an appeal against this ruling.

What might this mean in practice?

For housing authorities, this ruling offers a practical way to encourage tenants who also own real estate—and who no longer fit the target demographic for the social housing stock—to move on. The key lies in demonstrating that the tenant owns one or more homes, after which the heightened burden of proof shifts the initiative to the tenant. However, caution is advised: a housing authority’s public housing interest must be the underlying basis.

The ruling raises the question of whether landlords without housing association status can also terminate leases through the same process. Arguments can be made in favor of this, but they are not without legal risks. In this regard, the Supreme Court held that a religious denomination owning a courtyard home was entitled to invoke urgent personal use because making the living space available to its members served its own interests.³  Following this line of reasoning, subdistrict court judges have accepted that student housing providers such as Stichting DUWO and SSH (which are, however, an accredited institution and a foundation, respectively, and not purely commercial landlords) may also invoke “urgent personal use” as grounds for termination when a tenant no longer fits the target group, even if the statutory target group contracts do not apply.⁴

Nevertheless, caution is warranted here. First, a demonstrable, statutorily enshrined target-group affiliation is a strict requirement: case law offers no leeway for a purely commercial landlord who wishes to terminate a lease agreement solely for financial reasons in order to re-let the property. Second, the urgency was partly substantiated by housing scarcity, waiting periods, and the housing authority’s statutory allocation duty. A landlord without that duty will have to demonstrate urgency in other, substantiated ways. Third, the ruling conflicts with the 2015 Rental Market Mobility Act, which deliberately created a closed system of target-group contracts. The ruling disregards that deliberate legislative choice. For now, this ruling may serve as an indication to commercial landlords that terminating long-term lease agreements is not ruled out, provided there is a sufficiently compelling reason to do so. This also applies in situations where the tenant has additional medical circumstances.

¹ Amsterdam District Court, June 25, 2026, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2026:6491.
² Amsterdam District Court, March 27, 202, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2025:2080, and East Brabant District Court, February 12, 2026, ECLI:NL:RBOBR:2026:909: this case is still pending.
³ Supreme Court, September 20, 1985, NJ 1986/261 (Mennonite Congregation).  
⁴ District Court of Amsterdam, March 12, 2015, ECLI:NL:RBAMS:2015:1777, and District Court of Midden-Nederland, March 9, 2016, ECLI:NL:RBMNE:2016:1278.